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Abstract:  Two Turing Machines may be able to answer questions about each other that 
they cannot answer about themselves.
Red Machine
In a corner of a room, there is a Turing Machine [0], or TM.  The wall beside where it sits is 
red, and for that reason, the TM is affectionately known as “Red”, although it is not actually 
red.   Being old,  it  has no electronic communication ability.   For input,  a human has to do 
something (maybe push buttons);  for output, a human must look at its paper tape.  It has an 
infinitely long tape, fully loaded with every TM program.  Each program is a finite sequence of 
TM instructions, and there are infinitely many programs, and they are all on the tape.
Is one of the programs a function that, given input  p , computes the answer to the question 
“Does execution of program  p   terminate?”?  Let's suppose one of the programs is such a 
function, and let's call it  halts .  Since all programs are there, there is a program, let's call it 
diag , whose execution is as follows:
diag  calls  halts  to determine if its own ( diag 's) execution will terminate;
if  halts  reports that  diag 's execution will terminate,
then  diag 's execution becomes a nonterminating loop,
otherwise  diag 's execution terminates.
So whatever  halts  reports, it is wrong.  And we have our answer:  none of the programs on 
Red's tape determines halting for all programs on the tape.  As far as I know, this result is 
universally accepted.
It is almost universally accepted that the reason there is no  halts  program is that a TM is not 
computationally powerful enough to perform the task;  that's the definition of “incomputable”. 
But I believe that the reason there is no  halts  program is that the task is self-contradictory, or 
inconsistent.  Nothing can perform a self-contradictory task, no matter how powerful it is.
Blue Machine
In the opposite corner of the same room there is another TM.  The wall beside where it sits is 
blue, and for that reason, this TM is affectionately known as “Blue”, although it is not actually 
blue.  The two machines are actually the same color.  In fact, the two machines are identical in 
every respect except identity:  they are identically built, and their tapes have identical contents, 
but they are in different locations, and they have different names.  However, where a machine 
sits, and what its name is, do not in any way affect its operation:  the two machines behave 
identically.
For exactly the same reason that there is no  halts  program on Red, there is also no  halts 
program on Blue:  none of the programs on Blue's tape determines halting for all programs on 
Blue's tape, because that task is self-contradictory.
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Red and Blue Machines Thinking about Each Other
Is there a program on Red that answers the question “Am I the Red machine?”?  Of course there 
is:  its execution just prints “yes”.  And since the Red and Blue machines are identical, the very 
same program exists on Blue:  it also prints “yes”.  But this program on Blue does not answer 
the question “Am I the Red machine?”.   Although the programs are identical,  they do not 
answer the same question.  But there is a program on Blue that answers the question “Am I the 
Red machine?”.  It just prints “no”.  To answer the same question, we need a different program, 
due to the self-reference.
Is there a program on Red that answers the question “Can the Red machine correctly answer 
“no” to this question?”?  On Red, there is a program that prints “yes”, but that answer says that 
“no” is the correct answer.  There is another program that prints “no”, but that answer says that 
Red cannot do what it is doing (printing “no” in answer to the question).  There is no program 
on  Red  that  answers  the  question  correctly.   That  is  not  because  the  task  requires  more 
computing power than a TM can offer, and is therefore “incomputable”;  it is because the task is 
self-contradictory.  But there is a program on Blue that answers that same question correctly:  it 
prints “no”.  Blue correctly says that Red cannot correctly answer “no” to the question.  Due to 
the twisted self-reference, the task was impossible for Red, but possible for Blue.
Symmetrically,  there  is  no  program  on  Blue  that  can  answer  the  question  “Can  the  Blue 
machine correctly answer “no” to this question?”.  But Red can answer it: “no”.  Obviously, we 
cannot conclude that each of these identical TMs is more powerful than the other.
How to Compute Halting
In some ways, the halting problem is like the problem in the previous two paragraphs.  On Red, 
the  halts  program must report the halting status of programs that call  halts , thus creating a 
self-reference.   By  placing  a  twist  in  that  self-reference  loop,  it  is  a  self-contradictory, 
impossible task for Red to perform.  But maybe there is a program on Blue's tape that, given 
input  p , computes the answer to the question “Does execution of program  p  on Red's tape 
terminate?”.  Let me suppose there is, and call it  Redhalts .  Programs on one machine have no 
way to call programs on the other machine, so there is no program on Red that calls  Redhalts 
and then does the opposite.
There is a program on Red that is identical to  Redhalts ;  let me call it  Redhalts .  But we know 
that there is no program on Red to determine halting on Red.  The resolution of the apparent 
inconsistency comes from the preceding section:  identical programs on the two machines do 
not necessarily answer the same question.   It  is  possible that   Redhalts  ,  residing on Blue, 
determines halting on Red, but the identical program  Redhalts , residing on Red, does not.
Conclusion
The  usual  textbook  proof  that  halting  is  incomputable  does  not  prove  that  halting  is 
incomputable.  It proves that the specification “Write a program in a TM-equivalent language to 
determine whether programs in that same language halt.” is inconsistent.  It may be possible to 
write  a  program in  TM-equivalent  language  A to  determine  if  programs  in  TM-equivalent 
language B halt, if B programs cannot call A programs.  If so, halting is computable.
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Addendum added 2016-10-25 in reply to a question
I was asked “How does the computer know what question to answer?”.
Does a computer “think” or “know” anything?  The question does not call for experimentation 
or observation;   it's  simply a linguistic question.   We have collectively decided to say that 
airplanes fly, like birds do, even though airplanes are not alive.  We have collectively decided 
not to say submarines swim.  I know what computers do from the level of atoms right up to the 
level of programs.  But that doesn't tell me what to call that activity.  We, the English speakers 
of the world, have apparently decided to say that computers think and know, and I have decided 
to go along with that decision.
I can write a computer program that answers the question “What is the first letter of the Roman 
alphabet?”.    It  just  prints  the  letter  “A”.   Whenever  I  want  to  know the  first  letter  of  the 
alphabet, I can run this program, and it tells me.  How do I know to run this particular program? 
In a modern programming language, I might give this program the name firstletter, which is 
mnemonic.  But TM programs don't have names.  So I, a human, keep a piece of paper on 
which I have written various questions, and for each, the address of the program to run to 
answer it.  Another of my questions is “What letter of the Roman alphabet comes before “B”?”. 
And my piece of paper tells me the same address as before.  Whenever I run the program that 
just prints “A”, you might say, if you are inclined to use language this way, that the computer 
knows that I have asked a question whose answer is “A”, but not which one.
On my piece of paper, I also have the question “Are you Red?”, and the address of the program 
to  invoke on  Red.   When I  invoke this  program on Red,  I  get  the  correct  answer:  “yes”. 
Whenever I run the program that just prints “yes”, you might say, if you are inclined to use 
language this  way,  that  the computer  knows that  I  have asked one of  the questions whose 
answer is “yes”, but not which one.  Although Red does not know exactly what question it is 
answering, it answers anyway.  When I invoke the same program on Blue, which is identical to 
Red, I get an incorrect answer.  To get the correct answer on  Blue, I have to invoke a different 
program.
Suppose there is  a halts  program that  works on all  programs except those that  (directly or 
indirectly) call  halts .  I invoke it, and feed in program  gcc .  The computer knows which 
program I am asking about because I told it:  gcc .   But does the computer know that it is 
determining the halting status of  gcc ?  The name  halts    is  a clue to me, but not to the 
computer, and I could have called the program  fred .
Should  the  halts  program start  with  the  question  “What  is  the  halting  status  of  the  given 
program?”.  Well, yes, but as a comment for humans.  It doesn't help the computer to know 
anything.  It's still the halting program even without that comment.  And TM programs don't 
have comments.
I know that right now I am thinking about computers.  To know that, I not only need to be 
thinking about computers, I also need to have, and use, a self-reflective ability.  I need to think: 
“I  am thinking  about  computers.”.    If  we  haven't  invoked  a  self-reflective  program in  the 
computer, then I would say no, the computer does not know it is computing the halting status of 
gcc , but it computes the halting status of  gcc  anyway.
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